PAPPE, Nieman

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IS COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION POSSIBLE?

Is scoperation with the Soviet Union possible? Should we, time and again, do everything we can to avoid abandoning the principle of international coeperation? Or should we conduct our international affairs without Russian participation in the various conferences, peace treaty megotiations and other meetings where they are wont to be obstructive?

These questions, manifestly pertinent, are most difficult to answer comprehensively. One can only believe that cooperation with the Soviet Union is and will be impossible unless her policies take a quite unexpected turn. Herewith is evidence to prove this point of Tion.

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Cooperation is impossible because the Soviets themselves do not believe in the possibility of cooperation.

The Leminist-Stalinist philosophy teaches that peace is impossible so long as the so-called "capitalist" and "imperialist" world exists. In Lemin's works, published before 1924 and re-edited now, in all of Stalin's speeches and weitings jespecially in his recent writings, in the efficient georgel of the Soviets, in the History of the Bussian Communicat Party, and so on, the leitmetty is that communicate and or ism, Projetarian distatorship and so-called bourgesis democracy cannot co-emist; scomer or later there will be a collision, a wer which will decide which system will prevail.

The guiding themis of all Soviet activities is the theory that "Either they will crush us or we'll crush them." Symbiosis is imposbecause the western conception of the free democratic world and the Leminist-Stalinist conception are as different from each other as sky and earth. I shall try to demonstrate this by the following series of comparisons.

FEER DEMOCRATIC RORLD:

1. The state is the servant of its citizens.

2. Freedom is freedom from fear, freedom of aread, of speech, of vocation or occupation, freedom from needless suffering.

3. Good and bad are constant

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SOVIET SYSTEM:

The citizen is the servant of the state.

Freedom is a myth embedied in the concept of the distatorship of the proleterist and non-existent in actual life.

Good and bad are changing relative. ideas. They are absolute.

Everything good is always good, the purpose of communism. Bad is swill is and will remain evil.

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tactics wary, good and bad wary too.

4.All peoples must be given the opportunity to live according to their desire. Therefore, all sorts of political systems are admissable except those which endanger free humanity (e.g. Namis).

All peoples must live according to the principles of communism as only it will free them from hardship.

What today is profitable to communion can be tenerrow unpreditable and vice versa. Therefore they are not absolute or everlasting values.

5.Homan life is precious. People must be given the opportunity to enjoy life. he community must set individual needs and not viciate individual interests. Law individual property.

The idea is, above all, people must do everything possible to support communism. People must sacrifice their property and even their lives to create communism and to build a new must protect individual lives and seciety. Law sust protect the state, its institutions, its property. Individuals must be servants of the comsmoity (German Nasis said: Gemeinments kommt vor Eigennutz).

6-Mationality must be respected. People must be free to elect their governments. The borders of a country are sacred.

Policy with respect to nationality depends upon circumstances. A? national movement favoring revalution, aiming toward communica, with be supported. To destroy a colonial empire, national groups must be given the opportunity to build autonomous and soverign states. Their frontiers will be secred and must be defended from agression of the bourgeois world. If conditions make it possible to ascend to the mext stage, i.e. to create a communist republic, such states must be marged in the "State of the victorious Proletariat", which is the Societ Union. In a communist world there will be no states, or frankless. All nationalities will mait together into one nationality, speaking one language. (Stalin's thesis). Therefore, to realise this aim in the

fature, steps must be taken now to compel as many nationalities as possible to become ditisens of the Soviet Union.

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As a temporary measure, national culture (language, the press, arts, science, stc.) must be supported, but national culture must be national only in its outer features. Its spirit must be proletarian and sevictic (Shalin). In a completely communist, statelous and borderless society, culture mill be proletarian and sovietic both in feature and in spirit.

It is useless to quote more examples of Soviet conceptions. Even these few examples prove that the distrepancy in all basic conceptions in encauses. The above comparisons explain the irreconstitubility of the present aims of the Soviets and the democratic world. Let one may retort that all the Soviet theories outlined above are more theories, that they are only propaganda for domestic use and that the Soviets themselves do not believe what they are preaching.

That those theories are not more propaganda but the theoretical foundations of all Soviet policy and activity will forthwith be demonstrated.

II.

Even long before the war the peoples of the USSR were being told that the capitalists are enamies of the Soviet Union. A few days after the beginning of the last war, at open and closed party meetings and prepaganda meetings of non-numbers, people were being told that the Soviets and the Allies were struggling against their common enemy. This made them allies. But it did not mean that the interests of the Soviets and the Western Allies were identical. "They help us because they know that without our Red Army they would be destroyed by the Mania. Willy-milly they must help us. But, of course, in taking this help we do not intend to betray the principles of Leminism and Stalinism. We know what they want: they want to destroy the Rasis and to create a new port of Germany which will be a tool in their hands. But it is not our intention to destroy the Maxis only to permit the creation of another capitalist Germany. From this war Germany and all countries occupied by the Germans will energy as free Soviet republics. We cannot shed the escred blood of our soldiers only to please Churchill or the American buse. Commany will be vanquished and all countries will be freed, freed both from Masia and from capitalists. We cannot shed the saured blood of our Stainanovites and workers, of some of our collective farmelie, only to take chestants from the fire for capitalists. There are many people expecting our arrival: Turkey, Iron, China, Finland, the Balkan ples. All of them are longing to join their brothres in the USSE. And they will join us."

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This quotation is taken at random from a speech of the party secretary of one of the quarters of Leningrad early in July 1941. After the inauguration of lend-lease matters did not change. In the many confermess and talks which have taken place with the Soviets since 1945, has any substantial, satisfactory agreement been reached? No. The conferences have resulted in little or nothing - agreement on only a few minbr questions has been reached. Essential disagreement is not evidence than Molotov is a bad or a stupid man. Neither is Vyshinsky a bad man, although he is cruel and immoral. They are skillful statesmen. The Soviets simply cannot agree with the West because what is reasonable from the Mestern point of view is unacceptable to the Soviets as something endangering the fate of communism in the whole world.

A German peace could not be concluded with the Soviets because the latter would acknowledge but one kind of German peace, namely the transformation of Germany into a Soviet republic or at least into a Soviet satellite. Peace with a Germany which remains a "bourgeois" republic is unacceptable to them. How far they go in declaring that a state is bourgeois is demonstrated by the controversy with Tito; even he is a bourgeois. Why? Secance there are little deviations in his policies from those of the Soviets. If the Soviets are distatisfied with Tito, one must realize that their program in Burupe and all over the world is 190% communism in the Russian settern. That is the minimum. They will never agree to anything less.

Since this is the case, there will not be any agreement on Germany. It is obvious that in the foresceable future a separate treaty will be someluded for Mestern Germany. This, obviously, would be less difficult than the conclusion of a treaty for Germany as a whole. Mastern Germany will not become part of the new German state. It will become a Soviet satellite. This arrangement will not solve the German problem but then there is no solution for it. The eastern provinces will remain under Polish domination — de facts Russian supreme rule. What can be done? Rothing. Treation, parleys and conferences will not solve this problem. Thus the fate of Mestern Germany will be determined by the Mestern Powers and the fate of Rastern Germany will remain in the hands of the Soviets. The conclusion is papent: scoperation on German problems is impossible.

Tarm now to another perplexing problem, that of Japan. Although the Soviets themselves have suggested peace treaty talks with Japan, they will make the realization of a satisfactory peace treaty impossible. Already they have obtained rich prises from Japan - Sakhalin and other islands. They will not, propably, make further territorial claims. Let they will insist upon one very simple provision, the withdrawal of all occupation troops. New know that both China and Australia would object to the reassment of Japan. The Soviets know that a withdrawal of occupation troops would enable them to create conditions conductive to the

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remaining powers would not withdraw their troops if such an eventurality appeared likely but would insist upon a control consistion and the retention of some of their troops in Japan. The Sowiets eight agree to this, but would demand that the control consistion and socupation troops include representatives of all participants of the treaty. This would seem that Bussians and Chinese communist White would seem that Bussians and Chinese communists White would send troops to Japan. The Restern persons would not agree to this and an impasse would result. There remains but one may to order the Sowiets. This is to allow the personsent of Japan. While it is doubtful that Australia could be personsed to agree to such a policy, the objections of Communist Chinese, this would mean a separate peace with Japan, for the USSE would not recognise it. Thus in Japan, too, cooperation camnot be expected; it is not possible.

there remains for discussion the extremaly complicated Chinese problem. Instead of destroying or retaining the wimpons thay expense the Japanese, the Sowlets gave them to the communists, thus wislating a treaty with the only legitimate Chinese gerenoment. For one thing is known in advance, that the Sowlets will undertake the Sowlets will not cooperate with the Western powers on Chine but will, on the comparate with the Western powers on Chine but will, on the comparate that best to strengthen domainian there and to comperate Chine into their satellite. Thus, in Chine also, occapanation with the Sowlets is impossible.

There remain in addition many other contentious questions. Instead of respecting their treaties, the Soviets will exects trustle and try to undermine the work of democratic peoples. The Soviets are now telling their people that the United States is preparing another war. The Marshall Flan is being called a blaff. The Asiantis Fact is being depicted as an instrument of American agreeming. American statement are called names and are generally immulted. Them Wasi prepared was, in peace time, were decent. Now can any comparetion be possible under such conditions?

The Britsed Nations Organization is unable to decide upon enything because of Sorist obstruction. There is great danger that this requestable organization may degenerate into a talking shop where the only words spaken in Bussien will be atther propaganta or immaits order with the sammasuntal Sorist veto.

Thus there is no hope of comperation with the Society. The sing unswerringly pursued, are opposed to those of the Nastorn pamers.

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The recent blockade of Berlin offers a pattern for dealing with the Soviets under circumstances where they are untilling to cooperate. The air lift multified the effects of the Soviet blackade. No talks equal have solved the Berlin question. Only resolute actions removed the danger created in Berlin. Thus the best method of handling metters in which the Soviets are unduly fractious is to meet the situation with action, in spite of what the Soviets say they intedd to do.

The Atlantic Pact has created a new situation, one which compels the Soviets to limit their appetite. Similar regional security pacts between Far-Eastern and Near-Eastern countries plus further foreign aid will demonstrate to the Soviets that they still are weaker than the democratic world. The idea that they are weaker must be stressed constantly. Nords, speeches, even treaties and pacts are rarely effective by themselves in dealing with the Soviets. Action is more impressive. To be understood exactly, I must explain what sort of action is meant here.

It would make a profound impression upon the Soviets if the other powers began conducting vital foreign affairs, such as the settlement of the German and Japanese treaties, without consulting the USSR for its refractory opinion. The Soviets would be confronted with a fait factually e.g. they would be informed of the terms on which the other powers intend to conclude a peace treaty with Germany or Japan. If the Soviets disagree, the Western Powers would conclude a separate peace.

If the BESR declares it will not acknowledge this peace, what will it matter? It will not. Moreover, in Western Germany this solution seems forecreatized, for there is a Western German Federative Republic whose western borders cannot be altered by the Soviets and from which the Soviets cannot arbitrarily extract reparations. A separate peace can be made. It is not particularly relevant whether or not the Soviets recognize it. The government of Western Germany might conceivably even be acknowledged by the majority of the population of the future German state as the only legitimate government of that country and a peace with the Soviets might subsequently be concluded by the German government.

A separate peace treaty with Japan would be much easier to conclude as there is no Russian eccupation army. Japan could even obtain a guarantee of pretection from the United States under the peace treaty. Thus the Soviete would not dare to attack Japan.

These are only examples of possibilities for effective action. They have been given here to demonstrate that there are alternatives if the present attempts to "cooperate" with the Soviets definitely fail. To all appearances, they will definitely fail, for agreement on Germany and Japan is unlikely. Yet the present situation in Germany and in Japan cannot be extended for ever. A solution is urgently

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